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Abstract
I discuss the interpretation of spontaneous collapse theories, with
particular reference to Bell’s suggestion that the stochastic jumps in
the evolution of the wave function should be considered as local be-
ables of the theory. I develop this analogy in some detail for the case of
non-relativistic GRW-type theories, using a generalisation of Bell’s no-
tion of beables to POV measures. In the context of CSL-type theories,
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this strategy appears to fail, and I discuss instead Ghirardi and co-
workers’ mass-density interpretation and its relation to Schro¨dinger’s
original charge-density interpretation. This discussion is extended to
relativistic CSL-type theories. A few remarks on Everett’s interpreta-
tion conclude the paper.
Keywords: quantum mechanics, collapse theories, beable theories,
Bell, Schro¨dinger.
1 Introduction
Collapse theories are variants of quantummechanics in which the Schro¨dinger
evolution is modified in order to reproduce the phenomenology of the “re-
duction of the wave packet” or “collapse of the wave function”. Setting
aside attempts based on non-linear modifications of the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion (summarised e. g. in Doebner and Goldin 1996), collapse theories are
generally stochastic. We shall divide them in three classes:
• more or less ad hoc theories in which the wave function is assumed
to collapse upon measurement onto the eigenstates of some observ-
able (such theories can perhaps be attributed to Dirac and/or von
Neumann);
• spontaneous collapse theories of the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW)
type, in which the Schro¨dinger equation is supplemented by certain
random discontinuous transformations, so-called “hits” (Ghirardi, Ri-
mini and Weber 1986);
• continuous spontaneous localisation (CSL) and related theories, in
which the wave function obeys a stochastic differential equation of
a certain type (Pearle 1989).
Stochastic theories for the evolution of the quantum state have been pro-
posed also in other contexts (e. g. Percival 1998) — but we shall focus specif-
ically on these “collapse” theories, in particular GRW and CSL.1
The prima facie interpretation of these theories is of course in terms of a
“wave ontology”, whatever the details of this ontology may be, i. e. it will
1For an excellent introduction and source of references for these collapse theories, see
also the entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Ghirardi 2002).
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take the (universal) wave function as a complete and correct description of
an individual quantum system.
In this paper I wish to discuss an alternative approach to the interpretation
of collapse theories, inspired by a remark by Bell to the effect that the
“beables” in the GRW theory should be the “hits” (or “jumps”) themselves:
However, the GRW jumps (which are part of the wavefunction,
not something else) are well localized in ordinary space. Indeed
each is centred on a particular sp[a]cetime point (x, t). So we can
propose these events as the basis of the “local beables” of the
theory. These are the mathematical counterparts in the theory
to real events at definite places and times in the real world [...] .
A piece of matter then is a galaxy of such events. (Bell 1987a,
p. 205)
This is by all means a rather cryptic remark, and comparing the GRW theory
and the notion of “hits” with Bell’s (1984) own construal of “beable theo-
ries”, as we shall do in Section 2, seems scarcely enlightening. As shown in
Section 3, however, this alternative interpretation can be easily constructed
for the case of GRW-type theories (whether or not it corresponds exactly
to Bell’s original intentions2). However, as we shall also see, it cannot be
extended to CSL.
In the context of CSL, Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti (1995) have proposed a
different interpretation based on a Schro¨dinger-type mass density. I discuss
this in Section 4 and argue that, much in keeping with Schro¨dinger’s own
ideas, as expressed in particular at the 1927 Solvay conference (Schro¨dinger
1928), this can be seen not as a separate interpretation, but as a return to
a “wave only” interpretation. I also discuss this approach in the relativistic
setting.
I believe that the present discussion may further serve to show that differ-
ences between different approaches to quantum mechanics (collapse, beable,
or perhaps even Everett, as suggested in Section 5) are somewhat subtler
than one might expect!
2See also the remarks in Section 5.
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2 Collapse theories vs beable theories (in Bell’s
sense)
In order to understand Bell’s remark and see what is initially puzzling about
it, we must first present the GRW theory in more detail, as well as Bell’s
own “beable theories”.
The original version of the GRW theory (Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber 1986)
consists in the following stochastic evolution for the wave function, formu-
lated in position representation. For one particle, the Schro¨dinger equation
is supplemented at random times (with average frequency 1/τ) by a trans-
formation known as a “hit”, consisting of a multiplication with a normalised
(in modulus-squared norm) three-dimensional Gaussian αλ(q−x), with fixed
width λ, centred at some random position x, together with a renormalisation
of the resulting wave function:
ψ(q) 7→ 1√∫ |αλ(q − x)ψ(q)|2dqαλ(q − x)ψ(q) . (1)
The probability density in x for the hits is given by∫
|αλ(q − x)ψ(q)|2dq , (2)
which indeed integrates to 1 if αλ(q) is normalised. The suggested values of
the two parameters are τ = 1016s and λ = 10−5cm.
For N particles there will be N independent such three-dimensional hitting
processes supplementing the Schro¨dinger equation, which greatly increases
the frequency of the hits, and in typical measurement situations (due to the
entangled form of the wave function) even a single hit will induce localisation
of the wave function on a macroscopic scale.
Indeed, the theory is specifically intended to provide an approach to quan-
tum mechanics that makes it universally applicable (in particular both to the
microscopic and the macroscopic domains, as well as to their interaction),
and that makes it interpretable in an observer-independent manner.
An example of interpretation of the theory in terms of a wave ontology is
given by the standard eigenstate-eigenvalue link, i. e. the assignment of a
property P (identified with a subspace or a projection in Hilbert space) to
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the system if and only if the quantum probability of P is 1 (if the system
is in a pure state, this is equivalent to saying the state of the system is an
eigenstate of P ). One can argue that due to the macroscopic localisation
properties of the dynamics, the quantum state with such a wave-based on-
tology directly corresponds to visible reality, and that there is no need for
“many worlds” or for additional “hidden variables” or “beables”.3
In this sense, the theory is about the wave function. The wave function is
what there is, the ontology of the theory, or at least the visible, manifest
part of the ontology, while the hits are part of what determines the evolution
of the wave function.
By contrast, Bell’s (1984) beable theories are no-collapse theories in which
the wave function “guides” the evolution of some preferred observable (“be-
able”) much like in de Broglie-Bohm theory (de Broglie 1928, Bohm 1952)
it guides the evolution of particle positions.
Formally, beable theories are constructed as follows. Bell takes a (discrete)
projection-valued (PV) measure X 7→ ∑i∈X Pi (a quantum observable —
the more traditional identification with a self-adjoint operator follows via
the spectral theorem) and assumes that it always has a determinate value (i
or Pi), even if |ψ(t)〉 is not one of its eigenstates (therefore the designation
as a beable).
He then defines a stochastic process for the beable of choice. The process
should be such that
pi(t) = 〈ψ(t)|Pi|ψ(t)〉 (3)
is an asymptotic distribution of the process, in particular is preserved in time
(is “equivariant”, is a “time-dependent equilibrium” distribution). Among
the possible probability currents jji(t) for such a process, defined by
p˙j(t) =
∑
i
jji(t) , (4)
Bell chooses
jji(t) := 2~Im〈ψ(t)|PjHPi|ψ(t)〉 , (5)
3It is sometimes argued that this is not true, due to a supposed difficulty of interpret-
ing “tails” of the wave function. See Ghirardi (2002) for discussion. The mass-density
interpretation by Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti (1995) that we discuss below was partly
motivated as a response to this criticism. I plan to deal with the “tails” problem in
separate work with Max Schlosshauer.
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and, given this current, as infinitesimal parameters tji(t) of the process he
chooses
tji(t) :=
[
jji(t)
pi(t)
]+
(6)
(where [.]+ denotes the positive part).4
Examples of beable theories based on continuous PV measures of course
also exist, although I do not know of any fully general classification as the
above. In the case of position, the paradigm examples are de Broglie-Bohm
pilot-wave theory and the stochastic variant thereof equipped with Nelson’s
diffusion dynamics (cf. Nelson 1966).5
Also a theory of this type is intended to provide an approach to quan-
tum mechanics that makes it universally applicable and interpretable in an
observer-independent manner. To this end, at least standardly, the beable
is interpreted as providing the ontology of the theory, or the visible part of
the ontology.
As in the case of the “wave ontology” for GRW, there may be some ambiguity
about how to understand a “beable ontology”. One could identify the values
of Pi with subspaces of Hilbert space. On the other hand, they obey a
classical logic, so that this identification seems irrelevant. It also breaks
down in the case of de Broglie-Bohm theory. It thus appears more natural
to interpret the values of Pi simply as elements i of a relevant “state space”
or “configuration space”. (This will be the interpretation most suited to our
purposes.)
In order to provide an acceptable ontology, the beable of course needs to
be chosen appropriately: in the non-relativistic particle theory one usually
chooses particle positions (such as in de Broglie-Bohm theory). Bell’s aim
was to construct a de Broglie-Bohm-like theory for fields, and his choice of
4From well-known results one can canonically reconstruct a stochastic process from
such infinitesimal parameters, at least if they are bounded (Feller 1940). Note that the
parameters (6) become singular at the nodes of pi(t). A proof of the existence and unique-
ness of solutions also for this case was first given by Tumulka and Georgii (2005).
5The most general deterministic and diffusion-type dynamics for beable theories based
on position have been discussed by Deotto and Ghirardi (1998) and by Bacciagaluppi
(1999), respectively; see also Peruzzi and Rimini (1996). It is further known that if
one chooses an appropriate limiting procedure, it is possible to recover de Broglie-Bohm
dynamics and Nelson dynamics as continuum limits of discrete beable dynamics (in the
latter case the choice of infinitesimal parameters differs from (6)); see Sudbery (1987) and
Vink (1993).
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beable was fermion number density on a lattice.
A plausible criterion for beable choice is that the beable should be a deco-
hering variable, i. e. that on a suitable scale there should be no interference
between wave components characterised by different values of Pi. If this is
the case, then on this scale the transition probabilities for the beable (“vis-
ible”) dynamics constructed using Bell’s choice of current and infinitesimal
parameters will reduce to the empirical quantum transition probabilities
(which further reduce approximately to 0 and 1 in appropriate cases); see
e.g. Bub (1997, pp. 161–163).6
It thus appears that in a beable theory it is the beable that provides the
ontology, or the visible part thereof, while the wave function determines its
evolution. In these respects such a theory seems to be the exact opposite of
the GRW theory, and it thus seems surprising that the GRW hits could be
understood as beables.
3 Collapse theories as beable theories (in Bell’s
sense)
We now proceed to show how GRW hits can indeed be understood as beables
in a sense very close to that of Bell. We first take a step back, however, to
a “toy” case modelled on collapse upon measurement.
3.1 Toy example
In the traditional (more restrictive) view, quantum observables are identified
with projection-valued (PV) measures. Measurement-type collapse for these
observables is defined only if their spectrum is discrete,7 and is described as
follows. For some discrete PV measure
∑
i∈X Pi, the state undergoes upon
measurement the random transformation
ψ 7→ 1√〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉Piψ (7)
6For further discussion of this point, see e.g. Bacciagaluppi (2003).
7This point is already discussed by von Neumann in his book (von Neumann 1932,
Sections III.3, IV.3, V.1 and VI.3).
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with probability 〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉. Probabilities are normalised to 1 because the PV
measure is normalised to
∑
i Pi = 1.
Let us now define a toy spontaneous collapse theory by stipulating that the
above transformation happens spontaneously at random times (with some
given average frequency).
The theory as it stands is still a theory about the quantum state |ψ〉, and
we can take the standard eigenstate-eigenvalue link as describing the “wave
ontology” of the theory, i. e. the system has a property P at time t if and
only if 〈ψ(t)|P |ψ(t)〉 = 1.
While the “hits” Pi are clearly part of what determines the evolution of the
state |ψ〉, this interpretation of the theory has implications for the values
of Pi. Indeed, at the discrete times of collapse, the system discontinuously
acquires one of the properties Pi. Thus, the standard wave ontology implies
that at these discrete times the given observable has determinate values.
The wave ontology of course contains more than these values of Pi: at times
between collapses in general other observables will have values, and even at
collapse times — unless all Pi are one-dimensional — the value of Pi does
not fix the state |ψ(t)〉.
If, however, we wish to construct an interpretation of the theory in terms
of a beable Pi, we are free to ignore the additional ontology provided by the
quantum state. This would lead to a description of the system in terms of
values of Pi at certain discrete times. (We are free to “add” ontology to fill
the temporal gaps, postulating that Pi has a value at all times, say, constant
between “collapses”.)
One can go even further. While it is natural to keep the collapsing wave func-
tion in the formalism in order to describe the evolution of the Pi, one could
also consider the probabilities for whole stochastic trajectories Pi0 , . . . , Pin
as given by the generalised Born rule
〈ψ(t0)|Pi0U∗t1t0Pi1 . . . U∗tntn−1PinUtntn−1 . . . Pi1Ut1t0Pi0 |ψ(t0)〉 , (8)
and argue that this describes a generally “non-Markovian” process deter-
mined by |ψ(t0)〉 and the unitary evolution U (i. e. information equivalent
to the uncollapsed |ψ(t)〉). In this case one can imagine a non-collapsing
wave function as guiding the Pi (admittedly in a rather contrived way).8
8In the standard beable theory, it is not a priori necessary to take the initial distribution
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We see that in this toy example we can turn a collapse theory into a the-
ory about the beable Pi, with the quantum state (whether collapsing or
non-collapsing) determining the evolution of the beable. In this sense, the
difference between the standard beable theory for Pi, as sketched in the
previous section, and the transformed collapse theory, as sketched in this,
becomes purely quantitative. Further, in the special case in which the beable
should happen to be also a decohering variable, the two theories will at least
approximately coincide both qualitatively (in terms of what they are about)
and quantitatively (in terms of the values for the probabilities), although
the form of the laws will be different in the two theories.
3.2 GRW
We now show how the GRW theory can be reinterpreted as (or transformed
into) a beable theory by analogy to the toy example. To this end, we
point out two simple but apparently not widely known facts, both involving
positive-operator-valued (POV) measures
∑
i∈X Ei.
9
The first is that beable theories in Bell’s sense can be formulated also based
on POV measures, i. e. also POV measures can be used as beables.10 As
in Section 2, we sketch this in full generality only for the discrete case, but
again examples based on continuous POV measures are also known.
In the discrete case, one can construct beable theories for any given POV
measure by straightforwardly applying Bell’s construction of Section 2. In-
stead of (3), the asymptotic (equivariant) distribution is
pi(t) = 〈ψ(t)|Ei|ψ(t)〉 . (9)
One can take any current satisfying (4) for this distribution, e. g.
jji(t) := 2~Im〈ψ(t)|EjHEi|ψ(t)〉 , (10)
equal to (3). To extend the analogy also to this point, one could perhaps use (8) only to
calculate conditional probabilities, and refrain from identifying the initial distribution at
t0 with 〈ψ(t0)|Pi0 |ψ(t0)〉.
9Here, the Ei are so-called effects, i.e. positive operators with spectrum in the interval
[0, 1], and
P
iEi = 1. As a general reference for the use of POV measures, see Busch,
Grabowski and Lahti (1995).
10As mentioned in footnote 1, Gambetta and Wiseman (2004) have also independently
given a generalisation of beable theories to the case of POVM beables. Their construction
of the relevant stochastic process is based on the Naimark dilation theorem.
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and define the infinitesimal parameters for instance again using (6).
An example of a beable theory based on a continuous POV measure is
Garc`ıa de Polavieja’s (1996) family of phase-space pilot-wave theories, based
on POV measures of coherent states in phase space, i. e. joint position-
momentum observables.11
The second of the little-known facts is that the GRW theory already has the
form of a spontaneous measurement-type collapse as in the toy case, with the
difference that it is a measurement of a continuous POV-observable rather
than a discrete PV-observable.
Consider the special case of a (discrete or continuous) POV measure of the
form X 7→ ∫X Exdx, with Ex having spectrum in the interval [0, 1] and with
the normalisation
∫
Exdx = 1. A class of measurements of this POVM (via
“pure operations”, the only ones we shall need), is given by the following
transformation:
|ψ〉 7→ 1√〈ψ|A∗xAx|ψ〉Ax|ψ〉 , (11)
with probability density 〈ψ|A∗xAx|ψ〉, where the Ax are arbitrary (i. e. not
necessarily self-adjoint) operators satisfying A∗xAx = Ex. Comparing (11)
to (1), we see that a GRW hit is just a special case of (11), with the cor-
responding Ax = αλ(Q − x), i. e. given by the (self-adjoint) multiplication
operator with the Gaussian αλ(q − x). Thus the GRW dynamics is indeed
a spontaneous measurement-type collapse, namely for a specific “unsharp
realisation” of position. More general “GRW-type” spontaneous collapse
theories can be further defined by setting Ax = αβ(A − x), with arbitrary
width β, arbitrary frequency 1σ and an arbitrary (self-adjoint) operator A,
which may itself have discrete or continuous spectrum.
The eigenstate-eigenvalue link no longer gives us values for the POV measure
at collapse times, but we postulate, by analogy to the toy example, that at
collapse times the beable being spontaneously measured has a value, namely
the value x corresponding to the centre of the Gaussian instantiating the hit.
If we also (optionally) postulate that the values of all beables (one for each
particle) remain constant between hits, we have a well-defined prescription
for the stochastic evolution of the configuration of the system at all times.
11One of the interesting features of this theory is the fact that the POV measure used
is informationally complete, i. e. the (equivariant) distribution of values not only is deter-
mined by the quantum state but completely determines it in turn.
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The GRW theory is thus transformed into a position-based beable theory,
with a non-standard dynamics, which is not deterministic, not diffusion-
type and obviously not allowing for reinterference effects! It also has quite
different commitments as to what the visible ontology is supposed to be:
no longer the wave but the particle positions, just as in de Broglie-Bohm
theory.
Note that for this reason, the answer to the question of whether the theory
is a good candidate for a fundamental approach to quantum mechanics is
not automatically the same as in the case of the GRW theory. And in fact,
the following suggests that it is not. Macroscopic localisation in the GRW
theory is obtained throught he fact that a hit associated with a single particle
can and will collapse the wave function of the whole system to one that is
localised with respect to a macroscopic number of spatial variables. In the
beable version, the wave function also collapses (or effectively collapses)
with the first hit, but only the particle associated with this particular hit
will be localised where the hit has taken place. Since the other particles
are guided (or effectively guided) by the now localised wave function, they
will also jump to more or less the same location, given sufficient time. The
time it takes for a macroscopic number of particles to congregate around
the location of the first hit, however, is of the order of magnitude of the
average jump frequency times the macroscopic number of particles. That is,
the macroscopic localisation features of the theory are much less satisfactory
than in the case of GRW, where the visible ontology is given directly by the
wave function.12
This problem of course is only a problem if we stick to the original GRW
theory (i. e. if we want to implement literally Bell’s suggestion that the GRW
hits ought to be the beables). One could for instance take instead a GRW-
type theory with A some kind of product observable taking values in the
configuration space R3N of a system of N particles. A “hit” would then
correspond to a jump of all particles simultaneously. We shall, however,
not labour this point, as the approach will anyway fail to generalise to the
context of CSL.
12Another related difficulty, or at least an unintuitive consequence of the theory, is that
isolated microscopic systems will hardly evolve at all (one jump every 1016 seconds!).
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3.3 CSL
In this subsection, we shall first briefly recall the formalism of CSL. We shall
then recall a well-known but perhaps not widely known result about CSL
being a certain infinite-frequency limit of a family of GRW-type processes.
Unfortunately, the limit for the corresponding beable theories (constructed
as in the previous subsection) is singular, so that it appears that CSL cannot
be reinterpreted as a beable theory in Bell’s sense.
Following Ghirardi, Pearle and Rimini (1990), let us first define a general
CSL-type process as given by a stochastic Itoˆ equation for the quantum
state of the form
d|ψ〉 =
[
(− i
~
H − 1
2
γA2ψ)dt+Aψ · dB
]
|ψ〉 , (12)
where Aψ = A−〈ψ|A|ψ〉 and A = (Ai)i∈I is a (discrete or continuous) fam-
ily of not necessarily commuting self-adjoint operators, and dB = (dBi)i∈I
is a corresponding family of Wiener processes satisfying
dBi = 0, dBidBj = δijγdt (13)
(where δij is to be interpreted as a Kronecker or Dirac delta depending on
the index set I).
Specifically, the original CSL theory (Pearle 1989) is obtained by taking as
(Ai)i∈I the family (N (k)(x))k∈K,x∈R3 , with k labelling particle type and
N (k)(x) :=
∫
dqαλ(q − x)
∑
s
a∗k(q, s)ak(q, s) , (14)
where ak(q, s) and a∗k(q, s) are the creation and annihilation operators for a
particle of type k at point q with spin component s, and αλ(q) is the three-
dimensional Gaussian with fixed width λ as in the GRW theory. That is,
the N (k)(x) are number density operators locally averaged in a small region
around x, with the width of the average specified by the Gaussian. The
parameter γ in (12) and (13) is chosen as γ = 1τ (4pi/α)
3/2, with τ and α as
in the GRW theory.
A slightly different version of the theory (Ghirardi, Pearle and Rimini 1990)
uses locally averaged mass density operators (M(x))x∈R3 instead of the num-
ber density operators (14):
M(x) :=
∑
k
mkN
(k)(x) , (15)
12
where mk is the mass of a particle of type k, and uses γ = 1m20τ
(4pi/α)3/2,
where m0 is the mass of the proton.
A useful way of getting an intuitive grasp of what the CSL formalism yields
is as a limit of GRW-type processes, in the following sense (Ghirardi, Pearle
and Rimini 1990). Take a GRW-type process, defined by a spontaneous
collapse (with average frequency 1σ ) of the form (11), with Ax = αβ(A− x),
with an arbitrary (self-adjoint) operator A. Quite generally, this process
corresponds to a measurement of an unsharp realisation of A, which disre-
garding the Hamiltonian evolution would asymptotically drive the state |ψ〉
to some eigenstate of A (that is, if A has discrete spectrum). For fixed A,
we can now vary the parameters β and σ, in particular we can take the limit
β → ∞, 1σ → ∞, with βσ = γ (constant). Since all of these processes are
measurements of unsharp realisations of the same operator A, they all share
the same asymptotic behaviour, and one should intuitively expect the same
from the limit. The limit is well-defined, as discussed by Dio´si (1988) for
the case of A = Q and by Nicrosini and Rimini (1990) in the general case,
and in fact corresponds precisely to the process (12) for the case of a single
A in the family (Ai)i∈I .
In order to obtain the full (12), one has to consider several such GRW-type
processes, each with A given by a different Ai, happening independently and
simultaneously, and all being taken to the limit. The different Ai could be
for instance the positions Qi of the different particles i = 1, 2, . . . N . If one
chooses them to be the different N (k)(x) or the different M(x), one recovers
the CSL dynamics for the quantum state. Therefore the CSL dynamics can
be understood as a suitable infinite frequency limit of GRW-type processes
for local number density or for local mass density (one for every particle
type and every spatial point or, respectively, one for every spatial point),
and at least intuitively drives the system towards simultaneous eigenstates
of these operators.13
One might hope similarly to understand CSL as a limiting theory also when
the GRW-type theories are seen as beable theories. For that to work, how-
13For a more rigorous discussion of this point, see Ghirardi, Pearle and Rimini (1990).
Note that the localisation properties of the CSL dynamics are not governed by the width
β of the Gaussian in the definition (11) of the GRW-type process (since this represents
width in number or mass density and not in space, and anyway it goes to infinity), but by
the width λ of the Gaussian used in defining the local averages (14) or (15). For further
details of how the theory works and what it does, see Ghirardi (2002), Ghirardi, Grassi
and Benatti (1995) and Ghirardi, Pearle and Rimini (1990).
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ever, there must be a well-defined limit also at the level of the corresponding
beable dynamics. Dio´si (1988) discusses both the limit of the process for
the wave function and the limit of the process for the beable (in the case of
position). His analysis shows that, in the limit, the variance of the position
beable goes to infinity (cf. Dio´si 1988, eq. (3.7b)). Therefore, the behaviour
of the beable dynamics in the passage from GRW-type theories to CSL is
very singular, and this picture of CSL as a beable theory turns out not to
be viable.14
4 Collapse theories as beable theories (in Schro¨-
dinger’s sense)
4.1 Schro¨dinger’s charge-density interpretation15
In 1926, as is well known, Schro¨dinger published a series of papers in which
he developed his theory of wave mechanics. From the start, Schro¨dinger
thought that the wave function, the fundamental object in the theory, could
be used to give an anschaulich description at least of the stationary states of
the atom, and believed that by combining two stationary wave functions one
might find a mechanism for the emission of radiation with the characteristic
Bohr frequency νij =
Ei−Ej
h . While far from being the end of the story,
this is the basis for the semi-classical radiation theory still used today in
applications.
Schro¨dinger arrived at a workable proposal through his investigation of the
relation between wave mechanics and matrix mechanics (which already con-
tained expressions for radiation intensities), and proposed that the expres-
sion for charge density should be proportional to |ψ|2 for the first time in
print in an addendum in proof to his third paper on quantisation (Schro¨dinger
1926a, footnote on p. 476). At the same time, he explained his proposal in
detail in a letter to Lorentz of 6 June 1926 (Przibram 1967, p. 56). The
fourth paper on quantisation (Schro¨dinger 1926b) then elaborated on this
idea, giving an anschaulich picture of the interpretation as the superposi-
14I am extremely thankful to Lajos Dio´si for pointing out this important fact to me
(private communication, Bielefeld, February 2004).
15For further background details, see the discussion in Bacciagaluppi and Valentini
(2009, Chapter 4, esp. Section 4.4). Instead, the more speculative of the suggestions
below are peculiar to this paper.
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tion of all classical configurations of a system weighted by |ψ|2, a picture
described by Schro¨dinger shortly thereafter as that of the system as a kind
of “mollusc”.16
Possibly the most detailed articulation of the charge-density interpretation,
however, was given by Schro¨dinger in his report at the 1927 Solvay con-
ference in Brussels and in the ensuing discussion (Schro¨dinger 1928, see
pp. 451–454 and 466–471).
There, Schro¨dinger presents his idea in the following terms (his emphasis in
this and subsequent quotations):
What does the ψ-function mean now, that is, how does the sys-
tem described by it really look like in three dimensions? [...] I
myself have so far found useful the following perhaps somewhat
naive but quite concrete idea. The classical system of material
points does not really exist, instead there exists something that
continuously fills the entire space and of which one would ob-
tain a “snapshot” if one dragged the classical system, with the
camera shutter open, through all its configurations, the repre-
sentative point in q-space spending in each volume element dτ a
time that is proportional to the instantaneous value of ψψ∗. [...]
Otherwise stated: the real system is a superposition of the classi-
cal one in all its possible states, using ψψ∗ as “weight function”.
(Schro¨dinger 1928, p. 451)
Schro¨dinger then goes on to define a “charge density” based on the configura-
tion-space wave, the contribution from each single particle being calculated
by integrating out all the other particles.
It is clear that Schro¨dinger was very well aware that such a charge density
as he had defined does not generally behave like a (classical) charge density.
Indeed, as Schro¨dinger explains, these charges are not affected by other
charges or by external fields according to the classical force laws, because
the evolution of ψ is already determined completely by the Schro¨dinger
equation. Instead, they may be usefully considered to be classical sources of
the electromagnetic field, yielding insights into Bohr’s frequency condition
16Schro¨dinger to Lorentz, 23 June 1927, Archive for the History of Quantum Physics,
microfilm LTZ-13 (original with Schro¨dinger’s corrections) and microfilm 41, section 9
(carbon copy) (in German).
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and the selection rules (pp. 452–453). Nevertheless, Schro¨dinger emphasises
that this is only an approximation: first, radiation reaction is left out of
the picture, and, second, the action of the charges on some other systems
should in principle also be described by the Schro¨dinger equation (or some
relativistic generalisation thereof), but then there is again no place for a
classical electromagnetic field to mediate the interaction (pp. 453–454).17
Historically, Schro¨dinger ran into problems with this interpretation, partly
due to the limitations of the semi-classical picture (which attracted criticism
in the discussion in Brussels), but more importantly due to his difficulties
with the spreading of wave functions and, later on, to the realisation that the
Schro¨dinger equation leads inevitably to Schro¨dinger-cat situations. If one
realises, however, that classical behaviour and localisation are essential only
as emergent features on a macroscopic scale, then collapse theories seem
ideally suited for an interpretation along the lines of Schro¨dinger’s views,
and indeed a Schro¨dinger-type beable interpretation of collapse theories has
been proposed by Ghirardi and co-workers, as will be presently discussed.
An important point to note, however, is that Schro¨dinger presents this in-
terpretation as a description of how the configuration-space wave appears
in ordinary space and time. In the discussion (p. 469), he is explicit that
the wave equation in configuration space will presumably remain the central
tool in the theory, but that he wishes to grasp better its “physical meaning”.
Here, Schro¨dinger — the champion of the wave picture over the particle pic-
ture — is not saying that the fundamental ontology of the theory is given by a
charge density beable, nor by a dual ontology of wave function together with
charge density. He is saying (or so I suggest) that the ontology of the theory
is given by the wave function, and that the charge density he has defined
is a proposal for capturing the three-dimensional manifestation (and hence
the “physical” meaning18) of the fundamental configuration-space ontology.
Whether or not this is the most accurate historical reading, I suggest, as we
shall discuss more fully in the next subsection, that this position should be
taken as the most natural to adopt in this context.
17Note that, although formally a “classical” field, Schro¨dinger’s charge density is indeed
merely a quantity that behaves approximately in certain respects and emergently in a
certain “semi-classical” regime as a classical charge density would. If we apply the term
“charge density” to denote this quantity, we must be conscious of its change of meaning.
(This is quite analogous to the case of the term “mass” in special relativity, which denotes
a quantity that behaves like Newtonian mass only approximately and in a certain regime.)
18For further remarks on “physical” meaning, see the next subsection.
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4.2 Ghirardi’s mass-density interpretation
After Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986) introduced their original GRW
model, the question of how to best interpret collapse theories was first raised
by Bell (1987a), with his suggestion of the hits as local beables. Such a
question, however, started to generate a strong debate only after the so-
called tails problem was raised by Shimony (1990), namely the problem of
whether multiplication by Gaussians (which have infinitely extended tails)
could really be taken to localise a macroscopic superposition. We refer the
reader to Ghirardi (2002) for more details on this debate. Suffice it to say
that Ghirardi himself and co-workers were eventually motivated by the tails
problem to propose an interpretation based on mass density.
This interpretation was proposed in Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti (1995),
and it applies equally to both GRW and CSL theories. Ghirardi, Grassi
and Benatti take as the candidate for the local beable in the theory the
expectation value of the averaged mass density (15), and they postulate
that this quantity corresponds to an objective property of the system if and
only if its variance is much smaller than 1. While this condition is generally
not fulfilled in standard quantum mechanics, it is in collapse theories for
the bulk of the collapsed wave function (and not for the tails). The idea
is clear: only where the variance of the averaged mass density is small,
does the density emerge as a useful physical property, and in a collapse
theory it supports classical behaviour in the macroscopic regime.19 As a
further justification, Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti point out that differences
in mass density provide a much more useful metric on macrostates than the
usual Hilbert-space metric. Later, Ghirardi (2002, 2007) pointed out that
taking the average of the mass density operator is inessential, and that one
can base the interpretation just as well on the unaveraged mass density.
As presented in Ghirardi (2007), the mass-density interpretation has a dual-
ist ontology. We now wish to expand on our comments above on Schro¨ding-
er’s interpretation, and argue that also Ghirardi’s (similarly defined) mass
density should best be understood as the three-dimensional manifestation
of a wave-only ontology.
19Unfortunately, this objectivity criterion (although very useful in other respects) rules
out by fiat the only version of the tails problem that should be taken seriously, namely
the Everettian one. As mentioned above, I hope to address the tails problem separately.
See Section 5 for some further Everett-related remarks.
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We have mentioned in Section 2 that the standard wave-only interpreta-
tion of the wave function is given by the so-called eigenstate-eigenvalue link
(henceforth EEL): a quantum system possesses all and only those proper-
ties that are given probability 1 by the quantum state. Ghirardi’s mass
density, however, is an expectation value, so in general not a property in
the sense of EEL. What attitude ought one to adopt towards expectation
values? They are fixed by the quantum state, and include as a special case
the (eigen)values associated with properties via EEL. Why not extend prop-
erty assignments to include all expectation values? Indeed, the collection
of all expectation values fixes in turn the quantum state, so that one could
very well identify the state of a quantum system with the collection of all
expectation values.20 But if one does so, what makes the expectation value
of the local mass density special?
This is where Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti’s objectivity criterion comes in.
One normally restricts property status to those expectation values that are
dispersion-free, because they have a certain dynamical stability (namely,
they support repeatability of measurements). But expectation values of
local density operators, in particular the mass density operator, also have
interesting dynamical properties, at least in the context of GRW and CSL.
Indeed, the expectation value for mass density acquires a relatively small
dispersion in macroscopic states thanks to the collapse mechanism. That
is, the expectation value of mass density can be justifiably be considered an
(emergent) physical property of a quantum system in the classical regime.
Even classically, any function of the phase point of a system, say 3q2p +
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qp3, is a well-defined property of the system in an abstract sense. But
only some of these functions play an interesting dynamical role (energy, an-
gular momentum and so on), so that we are justified in calling them “physi-
cal” (or even “objective”). And some classical quantities only become useful
in a suitable regime (temperature or pressure, when defined as averages).
Also Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti’s (1995) discussion of mass density provid-
ing a better metric on Hilbert space for distinguishing between macroscopic
states can be seen in the same context, as an argument why mass density
plays a useful role at the macroscopic level.
Thus, if we are looking for a local manifestation of the wave function, we
are justified in saying that mass density is indeed such a local manifestation,
20This is precisely how von Neumann (1932) views the state for the purpose of deriving
his no-hidden-variables theorem.
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if only in the classical regime. With this proviso, which to a certain extent
may have been clear already to Schro¨dinger (cf. his qualifications regard-
ing the sense in which his charge density was indeed a charge density), we
can indeed embrace what we have suggested was Schro¨dinger’s view, that
mass (or charge) density is nothing more or less than the three-dimensional
appearance of the configuration-space wave function.
While a dualist position (wave and mass density beable) is perfectly justified
in a no-collapse beable theory, where the beable is defined independently of
the wave function, it seems less well motivated in the present case, in which
the beable is functionally dependent on the wave function. Indeed, the
beable appears to be ontologically completely derivative, so that a dual-
ist interpretation collapses into a wave-only interpretation: I consider this
wave-only interpretation to be the most natural reading of a mass-density
interpretation.
The only other alternative is to deny not only property status to general
expectation values, but to deny the eigenstate-eigenvalue link itself, i.e.
abandon altogether the idea of the wave function as a compendium of the
properties of the system, and postulate instead that the mass density beable
provides the only ontology for quantum systems. As we understand it, it
is this beable-only interpretation which is favoured by Allori et al. (2008).
(And perhaps it is even Ghirardi’s current position; cf. his remarks in Ghi-
rardi 2002, Fall 2008 version.)
4.3 Relativistic local beables
We shall now discuss the generalisation of Schro¨dinger-type beables to the
setting of relativistic collapse theories, in particular the proposal by Nicrosini
and Rimini (2003). We shall discuss this proposal rather than the better-
known one by Pearle (1999), because Nicrosini and Rimini’s fits in par-
ticularly nicely with the discussion in Section 3.3. In a very good paper,
Tumulka (2006) has discussed a relativistic generalisation of GRW-type the-
ories where the local beables of the theory are hits (or “flashes”, in Tumulka’s
terminology), thus beables in Bell’s sense. We assume that this strategy is
precluded in the CSL case for the same reasons as in the non-relativistic
case.21
21Note that it is easy to generalise the toy case to a relativistic setting: the generalised
Born rule (8) can be formulated in a relativistic setting, e.g. using the decoherent histories
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When discussing relativistic collapse theories, it is useful to separate two
questions. First, is the idea of collapse compatible at all with Lorentz in-
variance? Second, if it is, can one construct satisfactory Lorentz-invariant
equations for a collapse theory?
The current consensus with regard to the second question seems to be that
there is progress, as shown by the recent proposals by Pearle (1999) and
by Nicrosini and Rimini (2003).22 With regard to the first question, it
appears very natural at first to doubt whether relativistic collapse is at all
possible. Indeed, in a non-relativistic setting, if Alice and Bob perform spin
measurements on an EPR pair in different directions, then the form of the
state between the two measurements depends on the order in which they are
performed; instead, the initial and final states do not depend on the time
ordering of the measurements (see e.g. the discussion in Shimony 1986).
On the other hand, this turns out to be a problem only if one sticks to the
idea that collapse is an instantaneous process along a single hyperplane, i.e.
in a preferred frame. Indeed, there seem to be perhaps three ways to relax
the assumption of a preferred collapse frame, as follows.
(a) One can try to define collapse as a process on the forward light cone (or
on the backward light cone). This would make collapse manifestly Lorentz-
invariant (if the corresponding equation can be defined Lorentz-invariantly).
Indeed, a proposal for invariant collapse (along the backward light cone) has
been made by Hellwig and Kraus (1970).23
formalism, where, in particular, it is not necessary to impose a separate decoherence
condition in order to have the thus defined probabilities sum up to 1. (Note that if the
histories decohere, the theory will be empirically indistinguishable from a corresponding
toy beable theory.)
22However, Pearle (2005) now believes that one will obtain an overall more satisfactory
theory by allowing violations of Lorentz invariance on a small scale.
23Aharonov and Albert (1984) claim to show that Hellwig and Kraus’s approch, or in-
deed any covariant collapse approach, is inconsistent. While I believe forward or backward
light cone approaches are not always fully covariant (only when one has a set of “first” or
“last” collapses, respectively), I find Aharonov and Albert’s two objections unconvincing.
First, they construct a simple example (of a particle initially in two boxes, then collapsed
to being in only one box) in which charge conservation is violated in every frame of ref-
erence (this will be true also with collapse along the forward light cone). However, why
should we integrate charge along spacelike hyperplanes, if the collapse picks out as pre-
ferred certain piecewise lightlike surfaces? Second, they argue that Hellwig and Kraus’s
approach contradicts the predictions of standard quantum mechanics for certain observ-
ables measured using arrays of local apparatuses distributed along a hyperplane. Even
if this is correct, it only means that it is an empirical question which approach is to be
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(b) One can consider collapse to be a process that happens instantaneously
along all hyperplanes, so that the quantum state itself becomes an intrin-
sically hyperplane-dependent quantity. This strategy has been for decades
vigorously championed by Gordon Fleming (e.g. 1966, 1996).
(c) One can take the quantum state to be defined relative to arbitrary space-
like hypersurfaces, as in the Tomonaga-Schwinger formalism. This strategy
was first proposed by Aharonov and Albert (1984), and put in practice ex-
plicitly by Pearle (1990).
Admittedly, if one gives up the assumption of a preferred frame, the collapse
mechanism in general no longer provides an explanation for the correlations
in an EPR experiment.24 However, it is not necessary to find such an ex-
planation, if what one really requires of a collapse theory is to provide a
microscopic account of collapse without the need for vague primitives such
as “measurement”.
Pearle’s model, and its analysis by Ghirardi, Grassi and Pearle (1990) show
that strategy (c) can be implemented explicitly. This possibility has begun
to be recognised also in the philosophical literature, especially since the work
of Myrvold (2002, 2003).25 Still, the model suffers from technical difficulties
(specifically, infinite energy production). Later models show progress also on
such technical matters, for instance Pearle (1999) and Nicrosini and Rimini
(2003). We shall now follow the latter in order to present this strategy in
somewhat more detail.
The Tomonaga-Schwinger equation describes the evolution of an interaction-
picture state vector |ψ〉 as a function of an arbitrary spacelike hypersurface
σ, as follows:
δ|ψ(σ)〉 = − i
~
H(x)|ψ(σ)〉δσ(x) . (16)
Here H(x) is a Lorentz scalar field and δσ(x) is a small four-dimensional
volume through which a segment of σ around the space-time point x is being
preferred, and does not show the inconsistency of the approach itself.
24With the obvious exception of collapse along the backwards light cone, if it should
prove to be practicable (see the previous footnote). It is just as obvious that the correla-
tions remain unexplained in the case of collapse along the forward light cone. This is less
obvious in the case of hyperplane- or hypersurface-dependence, but note that, e.g., the
requirement that one have the same collapsed state regardless of how one arrives at it goes
beyond the requirement of integrability of the equations, i.e. of the path-independence of
the probabilities for the possible collapsed states.
25Let me publicly note my admiration for these two lovely papers.
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“moved forward”.
The relativistic CSL equation proposed by Nicrosini and Rimini has the
form
δ|ψ(σ)〉 =
[
(− i
~
H(x)− 1
2
γS|ψ(σ)〉(x)2)δσ(x)+S|ψ(σ)〉(x)δβ(x)
]
|ψ(σ)〉 , (17)
where
S|ψ(σ)〉(x) = S(x)− 〈ψ(σ)|S(x)|ψ(σ)〉 , (18)
with S(x) an appropriate Lorentz scalar field (which Nicrosini and Rimini
give explicitly, and which is related to mass density), and where, for any
family of non-overlapping δσ(xi), δβ(xi) is a Gaussian random variable with
δβ(xi) = 0, δβ(xi)δβ(xj) = δijδσ(xi)δσ(xj) . (19)
If (17) is integrable (which is not known26), i. e. if the evolution between any
two hypersurfaces σ1 and σ2 is independent of the way σ1 is moved forward
to σ2 (the relativistic analogue of Alice and Bob obtaining the same final
state irrespective of the order of their measurements), then it is indeed a
Lorentz-invariant collapse equation of the CSL-type.
The question we wish to discuss now is: can one define local mass density be-
ables (in Schro¨dinger’s sense) in such relativistic collapse approaches? The
case of strategy (a) is straightforward. Indeed, the quantum state is covari-
ant, so Schro¨dinger-like or Ghirardi-like mass density is always well-defined.
Instead, in the case of strategies (b) and (c), since the state is hyperplane- or
hypersurface-dependent, respectively, there is no unique (reduced) state de-
fined in a neighbourhood of a point x, and therefore no unique mass density
either.
Ghirardi, Grassi and Pearle (1990) have proposed to define an objective lo-
cal property at the spacetime point x (or in an appropriate neighbourhood)
if and only if it is assigned probability close to 1 by the states on all hy-
persurfaces through x.27 They also show (at least schematically) that on
the macroscopic scale, such a criterion yields the usual classical macroscopic
behaviour. That is, since the trigger mechanism for collapse is sensitive to
26Note that Pearle’s (1990) original model is integrable, as shown by Ghirardi, Grassi
and Pearle (1990).
27The motivation for requiring the probability to be only close to 1 is again supplied by
the desire to address the “tails” problem.
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macroscopic superpositions, all the states defined on the different hypersur-
faces will approximately coincide on the macroscopic scale (except for times
shorter than the typical collapse rate).
If I am not mistaken, in order to make the argument fully general one
must formulate it in terms of mass densities and of Ghirardi, Grassi and
Benatti’s (1995) objectivity criterion. If one does so, then, given the collapse
mechanism, and except for times shorter than collapse times, it follows that
macroscopic mass densities defined on all hypersurfaces through x will be
objective and approximately coincide. This applies equally to strategies (b)
and (c).
An alternative criterion for property ascription in the relativistic case has
been proposed by Ghirardi (2000): a local property at x is objective iff it
is given probability 1 by the state on the past light cone of x. This form
of the criterion has been championed also by Myrvold (2003). This now
gives us an alternative way of defining Schro¨dinger-like mass densities also
in the case of strategy (c), namely to take the mass density to be defined by
(the limiting case of) the state on the past light cone. Provided this is well-
defined (a question which is presumably related to, though separate from,
that of integrability), it provides the theory with a unique local beable.
Also in this case, we wish to argue that a dualist ontology collapses to
a wave-only ontology, because the arguments given in Section 4.2 apply
equally well to EEL and other criteria of property ascription given (unique)
non-relativistic quantum states as to the generalisation of EEL and other
criteria of property ascription to the case of (unique) states on the past light
cone.
As a closing remark, note that in this last case (and at least approximately,
also in the case of properties common to all hypersurfaces or hyperplanes),
the local mass density is exactly the same as the unique mass density in the
case of collapse along the forward light cone of strategy (a). That is, the
local mass density evolves as if the wave collapsed along the future light cone,
so that these different approaches to relativistic collapse will presumably be
experimentally indistinguishable and perhaps not so different after all.28
28This blurring of the different approaches is even more marked in the (no-collapse)
Everett interpretation. Indeed, in this interpretation the differences in the approaches
to “relativistic branching” are purely conventional. These approaches are the branching
along arbitrary hypersurfaces favoured by Myrvold, and the branching along the forward
light cone proposed by Bacciagaluppi (2002), while many-minds variants do not invoke
23
5 Schro¨dinger and Everett
We have argued above in Section 3.2 that there are some deep parallels
between collapse theories of the GRW type and beable theories in Bell’s
sense. Thus, the distinction between these two approaches, which seemed
very marked as sketched in Section 2, becomes somewhat blurred. We now
wish to return, independently of collapse theories, to Schro¨dinger’s own
approach to interpreting quantum mechanics, and perhaps blur some further
distinctions.
In August 1935, Schro¨dinger, describing to Einstein his “cat” experiment,
had written explicitly: “I am long past the stage where I thought that
one can consider the ψ-function as somehow a direct description of reality”
(quoted in Fine 1986, p. 82). And yet, later on Schro¨dinger returned to em-
phasising the idea of waves and continuous wave-like processes as providing
the best candidate for an interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Indeed, this is the position he advances in his famous article “Are there
quantum jumps?” (Schro¨dinger 1952) and in a closely related colloquium
given in Dublin in July 1952, published posthumously by Michel Bitbol
(Schro¨dinger 1995, Chap. 1). In the latter, Schro¨dinger is even more explicit
about his aims than in the better-known paper:
Let me say at the outset, that [...] I am opposing [the] basic views
[of quantum mechanics] that have been shaped 25 years ago,
when Max Born put forward his probability interpretation [...]
The view I am opposing is so widely accepted, without ever being
questioned, that I would have some difficulties in making you
believe that I really consider it inadequate and wish to abandon
it. It is, as I said, the probability view of quantum mechanics.
(Schro¨dinger 1995, p. 19)
In both the paper and the colloquium, Schro¨dinger goes on to discuss promi-
nent examples of discontinuous and particle-like behaviour in quantum me-
chanics and to explain them in purely continuous wave-theoretic terms.
It is evident that, despite the qualms in the years leading up to 1935, there
is continuity between Schro¨dinger’s thinking of the 1920s and of the 1950s.
global branching at all (see e.g. the reviews in Bacciagaluppi 2002 and 2003).
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Indeed, many of the examples he gives in 1952 he had already described in
papers from the 1920s, in particular his discussion of energy exchange in
resonant systems (Section 3 in both paper and colloquium), which follows
his well-known paper on the subject from just before the Solvay conference
(Schro¨dinger 1927), and his discussion of the photoelectric effect (Section 5
in both paper and colloquium), which follows one given many years earlier
in Die Naturwissenschaften (Schro¨dinger 1929).29
It is also rather clear that Schro¨dinger’s criticism is directed as well against
“quantum jumps” in their original 1920s incarnation as it is against any
form of discontinuous evolution of the wave function, or even discontinuous
guidance of beables, so that his approach of choice would presumably not
have been to interpret a collapsing wave function in terms of charge or mass
density, as we have described in Section 4, nor a beable theory in Bell’s
sense. It is less clear what Schro¨dinger’s approach of choice actually is, but
if one leaves historical scruples aside, it is not too difficult to imagine a
position that is quite consistent both with Schro¨dinger’s pronouncements in
1952 and with his main interpretive ideas in the 1920s, as follows.
Let us return to Schro¨dinger’s charge-density interpretation (or rather, its
mass-density variant) and apply it to a Schro¨dinger-cat situation. The
straightforward application of Schro¨dinger’s definition of mass density yields
a weighted average of the mass densities corresponding to the live and the
dead cat. This is clearly not a “classical” mass density distribution. It is yet
another little-known fact, however,30 that in this regime, because of decoher-
ence, the two components of the mass density corresponding to the live and
dead cat evolve separately as two classical mass density distributions would.
One half of the total mass (that which is distributed as a live cat) could
stand up and walk straight across the other half (that which is distributed
as a dead cat), without noticing in the least that it is there. While this is
again obviously not the behaviour of a classical mass density (note that it
violates Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti’s “objectivity” criterion), it can in fact
be described (as we just have) as corresponding to two mass density distri-
butions moving in the same three-dimensional space, both oblivious to each
other. If we renormalise the apparent mass, we get, as the three-dimensional
manifestation of the wave function, two completely independent copies of the
29A slightly more detailed discussion of these earlier papers can be found in Baccia-
galuppi and Valentini (2009, Section 4.6.3).
30As pointed out to me by Ward Struyve, the only other authors who appear to be
aware of this, and indeed discuss it at some length, are Allori et al. (2008).
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cat, one of which has died, while the other one perhaps continues undeterred
to play with the phial of poison.
It is worth emphasising that the three-dimensional manifestation of the wave
function is purely field-like, whether or not one has a Schro¨dinger-cat situa-
tion, so that any appearance of particulate or macroscopic objects has to be
extracted from the field a posteriori in terms of stable patterns. In passing,
we remark that Bell’s original proposal of interpreting the GRW hits as local
beables also relies on the extraction of patterns from the wave function, or,
more specifically, from its evolution: recall, indeed, that Bell writes that the
GRW hits “are part of the wavefunction, not something else”.31
The picture of the two cats, while surely an overinterpretation of Schro¨ding-
er’s own views, may resonate with modern Everettians.32 In fact, if the
above remarks on mass density as the three-dimensional manifestation of
the Hilbert-space wave function are correct, then this picture just is the
Everett interpretation. The difference to the usual presentations in terms of
Hilbert-space components of the wave function that constitute “worlds”, is
merely that here the emphasis is on the three-dimensional manifestation of
the different components of the wave function.
As remarked by Bitbol (Schro¨dinger 1995, p. 17), it also resonates with
some of Schro¨dinger’s own words (with the appropriate qualifications and
warnings about overinterpretation):33
Nearly every result [a quantum theorist] pronounces is about the
probability of this or that or that... happening — with usually a
great many alternatives. The idea that they be not alternatives
but all really happen simultaneously seems lunatic to him, just
impossible. He thinks that if the laws of nature took this form for,
let us say, a quarter of an hour, we should find our surroundings
rapidly turning into a quagmire, or sort of a featureless jelly or
plasma, all contours becoming blurred, we ourselves probably
becoming jelly fish. It is strange that he should believe this.
(Schro¨dinger 1995, p. 19)
31We conclude from this that Bell would not have endorsed a dualist ontology, nor going
as far as considering the POV beable as guided by a non-collapsing wave function.
32That is, with decoherence-based Everettians. See e.g. Bacciagaluppi (2003) and
references therein, particularly Saunders (1993) and Wallace (2003).
33I wish to thank Antony Valentini for first pointing out to me the existence of such
quasi-Everettian passages in Schro¨dinger’s writings.
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